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Abstract 
Investors who are more willing to accept risks when evaluating their investments less 
frequently are said to exhibit myopic loss aversion (MLA). Several recent experimental 
studies found that, on average, subjects bet significantly higher amounts on a risky lottery 
when they observe only a cumulative outcome of several realizations of the lottery (long 
evaluation period). In this paper we reexamine these empirical findings by analyzing 
individual rather than aggregate choice patterns. The behavior of the majority of subjects 
is inconsistent with the hypothesis of MLA: they bet an intermediate fraction of their 
initial endowment and these bets, on average, are not significantly different across two 
treatments with short and long evaluation period. We discuss several alternative 
explanations of this finding, including the Fechner model of random errors and the 
financial asset pricing model. 
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REEVALUATING EVIDENCE ON MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION: 
AGGREGATE PATTERNS VERSUS INDIVIDUAL CHOICES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The equity premium puzzle stems from the observation that individuals who hold low 
return government bonds when high return equity stocks are available should exhibit an 
implausibly high risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
propose myopic loss aversion (MLA) as an explanation for this puzzle. MLA is a twofold 
behavioral concept (e.g., Thaler et al., 1997) which combines greater sensitivity to losses 
than to gains (loss aversion) and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently (mental 
accounting). Since the frequency of evaluation is an important component of MLA, it is 
also related to the way in which individuals set their time horizons in choice under risk 
and uncertainty (e.g., Bhushan et al., 1997; Kelly, 1997). 
A testable implication of MLA is that for lotteries with a positive expected value 
and the possibility of a loss, a high frequency evaluation should lead to a greater 
dissatisfaction (Haigh and List, 2005). When the performance of such lotteries is 
frequently assessed, losses are more likely to be detected. Since the aggravation from 
losses exceeds the pleasure from equal-sized gains, this leads to a greater dissatisfaction 
compared to a situation when the same lotteries are evaluated infrequently. 
Empirical evidence on MLA is mixed. On the one hand, Durand et al. (2004) 
show that the analysis of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) is not robust. Fielding and Stracca 
(2006) find that MLA can explain historical equity premium puzzle only if investors have 
highly short-sighted evaluation period. On the other hand, Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy 
and Potters (1997), Gneezy et al. (2003), Langer and Weber (2005), Haigh and List 
(2005) and Bellemare et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence in support of MLA. In 
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these experimental studies, subjects appear to invest significantly higher amounts in a 
risky lottery when its performance is assessed over a relatively long time period. 
This paper reevaluates the experimental data documenting the presence of MLA. 
In particular, we take a closer look at the experimental results of Gneezy and Potters 
(1997), Haigh and List (2005) and Langer and Weber (2005). We show that while 
aggregate choice patterns in these experiments appear to support MLA, the majority of 
individual choices are inconsistent with the MLA hypothesis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
experiment conducted by Gneezy and Potters (1997) as well as summarizes design 
extensions introduced by Haigh and List (2005), Langer and Weber (2005) and 
Bellemare et al. (2005). Section 3 provides the reexamination of experimental results and 
shows that the majority of individual choices are inconsistent with MLA. Section 4 
discusses several alternative explanations of the experimental data. Section 5 concludes. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In the experiment of Gneezy and Potters (1997), subjects receive a task to bet any 
part x of their initial endowment on a risky lottery. This lottery yields –x with probability 
2/3 and 2.5x with probability 1/3. Experimental task is iterated for 9 rounds. 
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of the two experimental treatments. In 
treatment H, the lottery is evaluated with high frequency. Subjects make investment 
decisions at the beginning of each of the 9 rounds. At the beginning of round ݐ א
ሼ2, … , 9ሽ they observe the outcome of the lottery realized in the previous round. In 
treatment L, the lottery is evaluated with low frequency. Subjects make investment 
decisions only in round ݐ א ሼ1,4,7ሽ. The level of investment chosen in round ݐ remains 
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constant in rounds ݐ, ݐ ൅ 1 and ݐ ൅ 2. In rounds 4 and 7 subjects observe the cumulative 
outcome of the lottery realized in the previous three rounds. In both treatments subjects 
receive a new initial endowment at the beginning of every round. This endowment does 
not depend on the cumulative earnings in the previous rounds. 
Haigh and List (2005), Langer and Weber (2005), and Bellemare et al. (2005) 
extend Gneezy and Potters (1997) approach by introducing several modifications to the 
experimental design. Particularly, Haigh and List (2005) conduct an experiment with 
conventional student subject pool as well as a field experiment with professional traders 
from the Chicago Board of Trade. Langer and Weber (2005) increase the number of 
rounds from 9 to 18. They also use two other risky lotteries which return aggregate 
choice patterns inconsistent with MLA. Bellemare et al. (2005) introduce an additional 
treatment identical to treatment L except that subjects are able to observe the realization 
of the risky lottery in every round. They find that betting behavior in this treatment is not 
significantly different from that in treatment H. 
3. REEXAMINATION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Gneezy and Potters (1997), Haigh and List (2005), and Langer and Weber (2005) 
show that, at the aggregate level, students as well as professional traders are prone to 
MLA. Table 1 provides a summary of results reported in these experimental studies. On 
average, subjects appear to invest statistically significantly higher proportions of their 
initial endowments in treatment L compared with treatment H. 
[INSERT Table 1 HERE] 
In order to explore whether individual behavior can be explained by the MLA 
hypothesis, we use individual choices to partition subjects into three clusters: (i) subjects 
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who consistently invest 100% of their endowment in a risky lottery; (ii) subjects who 
consistently invest 1-99% of their initial endowment (henceforth an “intermediate 
amount”) and (iii) subjects who consistently invest 0% of their endowment. Table 2 and 
Table 3 show that the majority of subjects in the data set exhibit the same individual 
choice patterns in both treatments of the experiment. In the majority of rounds they invest 
an intermediate fraction of their initial endowment into the risky lottery. According to 
Table 2 and Table 3, only a handful of subjects abstain from betting on the risky lottery 
and 12%-22% (15%-37%) of subjects consistently bet 100% of their endowment on the 
risky lottery in treatment H (L). 
[INSERT Table 2 and Table 3 HERE] 
Since the majority of subjects consistently bet an intermediate fraction of their 
endowment, we take a closer look at choices of these subjects. Table 4 shows that 
intermediate bets are not significantly different across two treatments in all experiments 
with an exception of the field experiment of Haigh and List (2005) with professional 
traders. This exception is discussed in detail in Section 4.2.  
Our analysis shows that the majority of subjects invest an intermediate fraction of 
their endowment in the risky lottery in both treatments. Furthermore, these intermediate 
investments are not significantly different across two treatments. We now demonstrate 
that such behavior is inconsistent with the hypothesis of MLA. 
[INSERT Table 4 HERE] 
The MLA prediction originates in a deterministic cumulative prospect theory 
(CPT) developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). According to CPT, an individual 
derives utility from changes in wealth rather than from absolute wealth levels, which is 
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captured by the value function ( ) αxxv =  if 0≥x  and ( ) ( )βλ xxv −−=  if 0<x . 
Coefficient 0>λ  refers to the index of loss aversion (e.g., Köbberling and Wakker 
2005). Coefficients α  and β  are estimated to be both equal to 0.88. They capture 
diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses 
An individual who invests nothing into the risky lottery obtains zero utility in 
both treatments. An individual who bets amount x  on the lottery in treatment H receives 
utility 
(1)              ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )32315.2 −+ −= wxwxxU H βα λ  
where ݓାሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݌ఊ/ሺ݌ఊ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻఊሻଵ/ఊ and ݓିሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݌ఋ/൫݌ఋ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻఋ൯
ଵ/ఋ
 are the 
probability weighing functions for gains and losses respectively ( [ ]1,0∈p  and 
coefficients 0>γ  and 0>δ  are estimated to be 0.61 and 0.69 correspondingly). 
An individual who bets amount x  on the risky lottery in treatment L obtains 
utility 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )278327145.72775.0427195.0 −+++ −−+−+= wxwxwxwxxUL βααααααα λ  
Let 
( )
( )32
315.2
−
+=
w
wαλ  and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2783 27145.72775.0427195.0 − +++
−+−+=
w
www
β
ααααα
λ . 
Notice that when βα = , an individual bets nothing on the risky lottery in treatment H if 
her index of loss aversion λ  is greater than λ  (in this case ( ) 0<xU H ). An individual 
bets all her initial endowment on the risky lottery if λλ <  ( ( ) 0>xU H ). Finally, an 
individual is exactly indifferent between betting and not betting (i.e. she can invest any 
fraction of her endowment in the risky lottery) if λλ =  ( ( ) 0=xU H ). Similar prediction 
holds for treatment L with the threshold for index of loss aversion being λ  instead of λ . 
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For conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory ratio λ  is 
larger than ratio λ . For example, 66.1≈λ  and 33.1≈λ  for parameters estimated by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992).1 Taking into account different possible levels of loss 
aversion, Table 5 presents a theoretical prediction for individual behavior in treatments H 
and L according to the MLA hypothesis. 
 [INSERT Table 5 HERE] 
Table 5 has the following testable implications in the between-subject design of 
Gneezy and Potters (1997): 
A. Percentage of subjects, who bet all their endowment on the risky lottery, is higher in 
treatment L than in treatment H;  
B. Percentage of subjects, who abstain from betting, is higher in treatment H than in L;  
C. Percentage of subjects, who bet all their endowment in treatment L, is higher than the 
percentage of subjects, who bet an intermediate fraction of endowment in treatment H; 
D. Percentage of subjects, who bet nothing in treatment H, is higher than the percentage 
of subjects, who bet an intermediate fraction of their endowment in treatment L. 
According to Table 2 and Table 3, implications A and B of MLA are confirmed 
for all experiments. However, implications C and D are clearly violated. In all 
experiments the majority of subjects bet an intermediate fraction of their endowment on 
the risky lottery. Fractions of subjects who consistently bet an intermediate amount of 
their endowment are almost equal across treatments (ranging between 65% and 85% in 
different experiments). Moreover, except for traders (Haigh and List, 2005) intermediate 
                                                 
1 Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy et al. (2003) and Haigh and List (2005) considered a simplified 
version of cumulative prospect theory. This version assumes a piecewise linear value function                          
( 1== βα ) without non-linear probability weighting ( 1== δγ ). In this case 25.1=λ  and 
56.1≈λ . 
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bets of other subjects are not statistically significantly different between treatment H and 
treatment L. 
This finding can be consistent with the MLA hypothesis only if ratios λ  and λ  
are equal for the majority of subjects in both treatments. However, in order for the 
equality λλ =  to hold, it is necessary to assume an unconventional parameterization of 
cumulative prospect theory (particularly, γδ < ) which contradicts to the existing 
experimental evidence (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Abdellaoui, 2000). 
Furthermore if the equality λλ =  is true, MLA becomes inconsistent with implications 
A and B which apparently precipitate statistically significant difference between 
aggregate choice patterns in treatments H and L. 
4. DISCUSSION 
As it is demonstrated in the previous section, MLA cannot explain individual 
choices observed in several experiments on risk taking with varying evaluation period. 
This section discusses two tentative explanations of these experimental findings. 
4.1. FECHNER MODEL OF RANDOM ERRORS 
In every experimental round subjects face identical decision problem. According 
to deterministic decision theories, subjects should bet the same amount in every round. 
However, experimental data suggest that observed bets of the same individual are rather 
stochastic across different rounds. Moreover, Table 6 shows that the spread between a 
maximum and a minimum bet of the same individual is, on average, larger than the 
magnitude of a cross-treatment effect. This result is consistent with findings of Hey 
(2001) that the variability of the subjects’ responses in repeated choice under risk is 
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generally higher than the difference in the predictive error of various deterministic 
decision theories. 
[INSERT Table 6 HERE] 
Consider an individual who places bets in both treatments according to a simple 
algorithm. Starting from the status quo, she compares betting zero versus betting a 
fraction Δ  of her endowment.2 If the latter yields higher utility, she compares betting Δ  
and betting Δ2  and so forth until either further increase of her bet does not pay off in 
terms of utility or a maximum bet (100% of endowment) is reached.3 For simplicity, let 
us assume that risky lotteries are evaluated by expected value but this evaluation is 
distorted by noise.4 According to the Fechner model of random errors originally proposed 
by Fechner (1860) and recently axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2008), an individual prefers 
to abstain from betting rather than to bet Δ  in treatment H if  
(3)     ( ) 032315.20 >+⋅Δ−⋅Δ− ε   
and in treatment L — if  
(4)   ( ) 0278327125.027642715.70 >+⋅Δ−⋅Δ+⋅Δ+⋅Δ− ε , 
where ε  is a stochastic error term symmetrically distributed around zero. 
Let ( ).Φ  denote cumulative distribution function of stochastic error ε . Equations 
(3) and (4) then imply that the chance of observing zero bet is ( ) ( )616 ΔΦ−=Δ>εprob  
in treatment H and ( ) ( )212 ΔΦ−=Δ>εprob  in treatment L. Since ( ) ( )62 ΔΦ≥ΔΦ  
                                                 
2 Experimental data seem to suggest that for the majority of subjects the step size Δ is a quarter of initial 
endowment. For example, investment of 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of endowment constitutes 81.3% of 
all bets in treatment H and 85.7% of all bets in treatment L in the experiment of Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
3 Blavatskyy and Köhler (2009) provide experimental evidence that people decompose complex decision 
problems into a series of simple binary choice problems. 
4 Random errors may occur for a variety of reasons. To name a few, subjects can misunderstand 
experimental instructions, lack sufficient monetary incentives, or pencil in a wrong number by accident. 
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for any positive Δ , the likelihood that an individual abstains from betting is higher in 
treatment H than in treatment L.  
The intuition behind this result is simple. According to deterministic preferences 
(maximization of expected value) an individual always prefers to bet a higher amount on 
the risky lottery. However, an occasional random error can reverse this preference. Since 
in treatment L the stakes are three times higher than in treatment H, a larger error is 
required in treatment L than in H for reversing deterministic preferences. Hence, the 
likelihood that an individual abstains from investment is lower in treatment L. 
A simple calculation also suggests that the probability that an individual bets 
100% of her initial endowment on the risky lottery is ( ) ΔΔΦ 16  in treatment H and 
( ) ΔΔΦ 12  in treatment L. Thus, according to Fechner model, an individual is more likely 
to invest all her initial endowment in treatment L rather than in Treatment H. Intuitively, 
if observed behavior is a result of noise, an individual should bet all her endowment on 
the risky lottery in both treatments. In the presence of random errors, this deterministic 
preference does not always translate into observed behavior. However, not all errors that 
reverse deterministic preference in treatment H are sufficient for reversing this preference 
in treatment L (where returns to investment are tripled). Therefore, the likelihood that an 
individual bets all her endowment on the risky lottery is higher in treatment L. 
Probability that an individual bets an intermediate fraction of her endowment is 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ΔΔΦ−ΔΦ=ΔΦ−ΔΦ++ΔΦ−ΔΦ −Δ 166616...616 11  in treatment H and 
( ) ( ) ΔΔΦ−ΔΦ 122  in treatment L. Which one of these two probabilities is larger 
depends on the additional assumptions about the step size Δ  and the function ( ).Φ . 
Clearly, chances of observing an intermediate bet can be of a similar magnitude in both 
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treatments. Thus, a simple model of expected value maximization with Fechner-type 
random errors can explain the qualitative properties of experimental data that are 
reexamined in this paper. 
4.2. FINANCIAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
Recall from Section 3 that in contrast to that of students, individual choices of 
professional traders in the experiment of Haigh and List (2005) appear to be consistent 
with the hypothesis of MLA. In order to explain this finding we consider a financial asset 
pricing model as a tentative explanation of traders’ behavior. 
In a standard asset pricing model, investment opportunities are represented as 
points in a two-dimensional risk-return space (e.g. Figure 1). Notably, risk embedded in 
an investment project is conventionally measured as a standard deviation of possible 
returns. Betting on the risky lottery in treatment L yields a three times higher expected 
return, compared to treatment H, but the standard deviation of possible returns is only 
3  times higher. Figure 1 shows that for every investment portfolio in treatment H 
(located on the line OH) there is a corresponding portfolio in treatment L (located on the 
line OL) that either yields a higher expected return for the same level of risk, or yields the 
same expected return with a lower risk. Thus, betting on the risky lottery appears to be at 
least as rewarding in treatment L as in treatment H.  
This argument can explain observed behavior in the field experiment of Haigh 
and List (2005) with professional traders. Professional traders are likely to frame the 
experiment in terms of the asset pricing model. They are accustomed to this model due to 
the nature of their profession and their training. Thus, our finding that intermediate bets 
of traders (in contrast to those of undergraduate students) are significantly different 
across two treatments (e.g., Table 4) can be explained by the fact that traders perceive 
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field experiment as a portfolio allocation problem in which they face relatively less risky 
option in treatment L than in treatment H. 
[INSERT Figure 1 HERE] 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper uses the experimental data on risk taking and evaluation periods 
reported in Gneezy and Potters (1997), Haigh and List (2005) and Langer and Weber 
(2005) to explore whether and to what extent MLA can explain and predict behavior of 
experimental subjects. A close reexamination of the data suggests that while at the 
aggregate level observed choice patterns can be reconciled with the MLA hypothesis, the 
majority of individual choices are inconsistent with MLA. Experimental subjects invest 
intermediate fractions of their initial endowment in the risky lottery. Moreover, these 
intermediate bets do not appear to vary significantly with the length of the evaluation 
period. 
We find that while the experimental results cannot be fully rationalized by MLA, 
several alternative explanations are possible. Particularly, the Fechner model of random 
errors (Fechner, 1860) can be evoked to capture the qualitative properties of the 
experimental data. The Fechner model suggests that an individual evaluates risky lotteries 
according to a deterministic decision theory, but this evaluation is affected by random 
errors. The smaller the difference between two lotteries in terms of utility, the more likely 
are random errors to reverse deterministic preferences. 
We show that a simple model of expected value maximization combined with a 
standard Fechner model of random errors explains the experimental data. In the long 
evaluation period lotteries are more distinct in terms of utility than in the short evaluation 
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period. Hence, an individual preference for betting on the risky lottery is less vulnerable 
to errors when lotteries are evaluated infrequently. 
The behavior of professional traders in the field experiment of Haigh and List 
(2005) could be rationalized using a standard financial asset pricing model. We show that 
while traders seem to exhibit behavioral patterns consistent with MLA, it is also possible 
and likely that, due to their training and experience, they apply standard asset pricing 
toolbox in experimental situations resembling conventional portfolio allocation problems. 
Our findings suggest that experiments on risk taking and evaluation periods seem 
to provide evidence of phenomena other than MLA. Several experimental studies (e.g., 
Plott and Zeiler 2005 and 2006) reevaluate asymmetries in exchange behavior initially 
interpreted as evidence of endowment effect predicted by loss aversion. They find that 
these asymmetries might result from subjects’ misconceptions about the experimental 
procedure. We show that a similar critique of experimental evidence can be applied to 
research cited in support of myopic loss aversion. 
Our results also indicate that there is much work to be done in developing a model 
capable of explaining the data on risk taking and evaluation periods. It is also necessary 
to design an experimental procedure which will give an opportunity to compare expected 
utility theory (EUT) approach with the MLA hypothesis in the laboratory. Even though 
much progress has been made in the direction of developing an appropriate procedure, to 
date, existing experimental algorithms, by in large, fail to discriminate between the EUT 
and the MLA hypotheses. 
Finally, one of the interesting endeavors for future research is to conduct studies 
testing MLA as well as other tentative explanations of individual behavior in choice 
under risk with different evaluation periods. For example, one experiment that allows us 
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to discriminate between different models proposed in this paper (i.e. the Fechner model 
of random errors and the financial asset pricing model) can be the following. In treatment 
H, a subject who invests x from the initial endowment receives –x with probability 2/3 
and 2.5x with probability 1/3 at the end of the period. In treatment L, a subject who 
invests x from the initial endowment receives –x/3 with probability 2/3 and 5x/6 with 
probability 1/3 at the end of the period. As usual, in this treatment the subject does not 
observe individual earnings at the end of the period. She observes only the cumulative 
earnings at the end of three consecutive periods. In this proposed future experiment, a 
simple model of expected value maximization combined with the Fechner model of 
random errors predicts that there is no significant difference in individual choice patterns 
across two treatments. In contrast, the financial asset pricing model predicts that 
individuals invest more in treatment L. This laboratory experiment can distinguish 
between two models. 
More importantly, it is worthwhile to explore whether individual behavior of 
traders outside the laboratory can be predicted by MLA, the Fechner model of random 
errors and the financial asset pricing model. Traders may have very short time horizons 
due to the fact that they evaluate their earnings on a daily basis. Such a high frequency of 
evaluation should result in traders being implausibly highly risk averse (e.g., Mehra and 
Prescott, 1985). Yet, non-experimental studies in finance suggest that traders tend to 
suffer from various behavioral biases which are likely to affect their behavior. For 
example, Coval and Shumway (2005) show that traders tend to exhibit high levels of loss 
aversion expecting above average afternoon risk to recover from morning losses. As a 
result, such traders engage in risk-seeking trading: they buy contracts at higher prices and 
sell contract at lower prices than those that prevailed previously. Odean (1998) argues 
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that traders are also prone to overconfidence. Incorporating such behavioral biases into 
theoretical predictions and testing the fit of these predictions using laboratory and non-
experimental data will give an opportunity to differentiate among various theoretical 
explanations, to determine a new agenda for the research on risk taking and evaluation 
periods as well as to deepen our understanding of professional behavior exhibited by 
professional traders. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Rounds 
Average percentage of endowment bet 
(standard deviation) Mann-Whitney 
statistic (p-value) 
Treatment H Treatment L 
St
ud
en
ts
 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
Rounds 1-3 52.0 (30.2) 66.7 (29.5) -2.08 (0.018) 
Rounds 4-6 44.8 (30.0) 63.7 (30.3) -2.78 (0.003) 
Rounds 7-9 54.7 (28.9) 71.9 (29.4) -2.51 (0.006) 
Rounds 1-9 50.5 (26.7) 67.4 (27.3) -2.86 (0.002) 
Haigh and List (2005) 
Rounds 1-3 42.77 (31.16) 56.50  (25.75) -2.35 (0.019) 
Rounds 4-6 51.77 (30.64) 62.72  (26.69) -1.48 (0.138) 
Rounds 7-9 58.13 (28.52) 68.28  (26.88) -1.45 (0.146) 
Rounds 1-9 50.89 (30.48) 62.50  (26.56) -1.82 (0.069) 
Langer and Weber (2005) 
Rounds 1-18 44.6 - 59.9 - - (<0.05) 
T
ra
de
rs
 Haigh and List (2005) 
Rounds 1-3 48.85 (30.88) 66.22 (27.50) -2.19 (0.029) 
Rounds 4-6 39.10 (33.11) 75.56 (24.58) -3.90 (0.000) 
Rounds 7-9 48.83 (34.24) 81.41 (22.74) -3.55 (0.000) 
Rounds 1-9 45.59 (32.69) 74.29 (25.49) -3.48 (0.000) 
Table 1 Average percentage of initial endowment invested in the risky lottery in 
treatments H and L by all subjects as reported in Gneezy and Potters (1997), Haigh 
and List (2005) and Langer and Weber (2005) 
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Clusters of 
individual choices 
Number (percentage) of subjects  
Students Traders 
Gneezy and 
Potters 
(1997) 
Haigh and 
List 
(2005) 
Langer and 
Weber 
(2005) 
Haigh and 
List 
(2005) 
Invest 100% of endowment in 
the majority of rounds1  7 (17.1 %) 5 (15.7 %) 2 (12.5%) 6 (22.2 %) 
Invest 1%-99% of endowment 
in the majority of rounds  27 (65.8 %) 25 (78.1 %) 13 (81.2%) 17 (63.0 %) 
Invest 0% of endowment in 
the majority of rounds  4 (9.8 %) 1 (3.1 %) 1 (6.3%) 2 (7.4 %) 
Other 3 (7.3 %) 1 (3.1 %) 0 (0.0%) 2 (7.4 %) 
Table 2 Individual choices observed in Treatment H 
Clusters of 
individual choices 
Number (percentage) of subjects  
Students Traders 
Gneezy and 
Potters 
(1997) 
Haigh and 
List 
(2005) 
Langer and 
Weber 
(2005) 
Haigh and 
List 
(2005) 
Invest 100% of endowment in 
the majority of rounds  15 (35.7 %) 6 (18.8 %) 3 (15.0%) 10 (37.0 %) 
Invest 1%-99% of endowment 
in the majority of rounds  27 (64.3 %) 26 (81.2 %) 17 (85.0%) 17 (63.0 %) 
Invest 0% of endowment in 
the majority of rounds  0 (0.0 %) 0 (0.0 %) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0 %) 
Table 3  Individual choices observed in Treatment L 
  
                                                 
1 Majority is defined as 5 rounds for experiments of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Haigh and List (2005) 
and 10 rounds for the experiment of Langer and Weber (2005). 
 19
 
Rounds 
Average percentage of endowment bet 
(standard deviation) Mann-Whitney 
statistic (p-value) 
Treatment H Treatment L 
St
ud
en
ts
 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
Rounds 1-3 43.71 (15.74) 50.00 (21.68) -0.8118 (0.4169) 
Rounds 4-6 37.69 (19.74) 43.52 (16.34) -1.2893 (0.1973) 
Rounds 7-9 45.40 (19.25) 56.24 (25.55) -1.3390 (0.1806) 
Rounds 1-9 42.27 (15.58) 49.92 (16.54) -1.7436 (0.0812) 
Haigh and List (2005) 
Rounds 1-3 34.88 (20.49) 49.72 (21.59) -2.5758 (0.0100) 
Rounds 4-6 46.13 (22.63) 52.28 (20.04) -0.9641 (0.3350) 
Rounds 7-9 55.07 (25.02) 59.40 (23.61) -0.6804 (0.4962) 
Rounds 1-9 45.36 (19.23) 53.80 (19.64) -1.5922 (0.1113) 
Langer and Weber (2005) 
Rounds 1-6 39.87 (24.29) 49.56 (16.49) -1.5293 (0.1262) 
Rounds 7-12 39.87 (23.51) 52.94 (22.56) -1.3404 (0.1801) 
Rounds 13-18 41.54 (26.38) 56.18 (25.71) -1.3404 (0.1801) 
Rounds 1-18 40.43 (22.65) 52.89 (19.56) -1.6744 (0.0940) 
T
ra
de
rs
 Haigh and List (2005) 
Rounds 1-3 33.18 (23.69) 51.94 (21.90) -2.3850 (0.0171) 
Rounds 4-6 27.98 (17.41) 60.69 (19.46) -3.8802 (0.0001) 
Rounds 7-9 38.39 (26.28) 70.47 (22.31) -3.2629 (0.0011) 
Rounds 1-9 33.18 (19.19) 61.03 (19.25) -3.5493 (0.0004) 
Table 4 Average percentage of initial endowment invested in the risky lottery in 
treatments H and L by subjects who bet intermediate fraction of their endowment 
in the majority of experimental rounds 
Index of loss aversion λ  λλ <  λλ =  λλλ << λλ =  λλ >  
Betting on the risky 
lottery in treatment H everything anything nothing nothing nothing 
Betting on the risky 
lottery in treatment L everything everything everything anything nothing 
Table 5 MLA prediction for individual behavior in treatments H and L 
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Experiment 
Indicators 
(in percent of initial endowment) 
Students Traders
Gneezy 
and 
Potters 
(1997) 
Haigh 
and 
List 
(2005) 
Langer 
and 
Weber 
(2005) 
Haigh 
and 
List 
(2005) 
Average spread between maximum and 
minimum bet of the same subject in treatment H 44.7 46.1 58.8 55.6 
Median spread between maximum and minimum 
bet of the same subject in treatment H 45.0 40.0 70.0 67.0 
Average spread between maximum and 
minimum bet of the same subject in treatment L 17.4 20.0 28.3 18.1 
Median spread between maximum and minimum 
bet of the same subject in treatment L 0.0 20.0 27.5 20.0 
Difference between average bets in treatments H 
and L (between subject) 16.9 11.6 14.9 28.7 
Difference between median bets in treatments H 
and L (between subject) 0.0 10.0 30.0 40.0 
Table 6 Within-subject volatility versus cross-treatment effect 
 
 
Figure 1  Investment portfolios available in treatments H and L 
187 67  
L 
H 
O 
Expected Return 
Standard Deviation 
Zero Investment 
Investment of 
all endowment 
in treatment H 
Investment of 
all endowment 
in treatment L 
6
1  
2
1  
